{
  "annotation_id": "6a7543b2-69b1-4828-8f10-7ccf61994f86",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:55.458000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:55.458000Z",
  "file_hash": "576ab392914d328aea824f577e1dec8b65fffa5e1e6c952e80cb99d471cd3653",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We introduce a new class of quantum quantum key distribution protocols,\ntailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study\none of these protocols, which differs from the BB84 only in the classical\nsifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS\nattacks at zero error.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0211131",
    "authors": [
      "Valerio Scarani",
      "Antonio Acin",
      "Gregoire Ribordy",
      "Nicolas Gisin"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.057901",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004)",
    "title": "Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting   attacks for weak laser pulses implementations",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0211131"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "bb6263ee-a453-4d32-b6d9-bd446f37cc61",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}