{
  "annotation_id": "671c4326-b429-4fbf-becb-e343ce495138",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:56.138000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:56.138000Z",
  "file_hash": "14f5cc8fed9b55f20bf08a8fc556941de9dfd5449cc07ee2d161ed48eca7d6cb",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Practical implementations of quantum cryptography use attenuated laser pulses\nas the signal source rather than single photons. The channels used to transmit\nare also lossy. Here we give a simple derivation of two beam-splitting attacks\non quantum cryptographic systems using laser pulses, either coherent or mixed\nstates with any mean photon number. We also give a simple derivation of a\nphoton-number splitting attack, the most advanced, both in terms of performance\nand technology required. We find bounds on the maximum disturbance for a given\nmean photon number and observed channel transmission efficiency for which a\nsecret key can be distilled. We start by reviewing two incoherent attacks that\ncan be used on single photon quantum cryptographic systems. These results are\nthen adapted to systems that use laser pulses and lossy channels.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0211155",
    "authors": [
      "Mark Williamson",
      "Vlatko Vedral"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1080/09500340308235253",
    "journal_ref": "J. Mod. Opt. 50(13), 1989-2011",
    "title": "Eavesdropping on practical quantum cryptography",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0211155"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "3070f503-79d4-4f1c-aa90-519a50090ff7",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}