{
  "annotation_id": "655f4fa3-9e08-4bad-9618-8f326076952e",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:34.824000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:34.824000Z",
  "file_hash": "dc2247956e667bbf7cab873a4da9bcbe0108c21c95afedfb319794d8193ed7db",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of\ninteracting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described\nwithin game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental\nconcepts of evolutionary game theory and review basic properties of\ndeterministic replicator dynamics and stochastic dynamics of finite\npopulations. We discuss stability of equilibria in deterministic dynamics with\nmigration, time-delay, and in stochastic dynamics of well-mixed populations and\nspatial games with local interactions. We analyze the dependence of the\nlong-run behaviour of a population on various parameters such as the time\ndelay, the noise level, and the size of the population.",
    "arxiv_id": "q-bio/0703062",
    "authors": [
      "Jacek Miekisz"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "q-bio.PE",
      "cond-mat.stat-mech"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1940: 269-316 (2008)",
    "title": "Evolutionary game theory and population dynamics",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0703062"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "5e687404-bcb6-449e-a8c9-e2941ea83bad",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}