{
  "annotation_id": "64632ea7-7247-43c6-9654-726acae0e16e",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:52.873000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:52.873000Z",
  "file_hash": "0668a184171164223e6067a40326130a58468c8f96b11e96981f1b13e33815e9",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution\nprotocol for an arbitrary source whose averaged states are basis-independent, a\ncondition that is automatically satisfied if the source is suitably designed.\nThe proof is based on the observation that, to an adversary, the key extraction\nprocess is equivalent to a measurement in the sigma_x-basis performed on a pure\nsigma_z-basis eigenstate. The dependence of the achievable key length on the\nbit error rate is the same as that established by Shor and Preskill for a\nperfect source, indicating that the defects in the source are efficiently\ndetected by the protocol.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0208155",
    "authors": [
      "Masato Koashi",
      "John Preskill"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.057902",
    "journal_ref": "Phys.Rev.Lett. 90 (2003) 057902",
    "title": "Secure quantum key distribution with an uncharacterized source",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0208155"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "d62e188c-d46e-4b8e-991d-6a62cfb85e10",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}