{
  "annotation_id": "6277d03f-1ea8-4571-acdd-adf5622a5efc",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:17.898000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:17.898000Z",
  "file_hash": "cfe48a7c5f8c4cf841927faa5e93bfc558d458c6877dce86f8d5e33beb69fb91",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of\ncooperation--Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship\nnetwork obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social\nnetwork has small-world property and degree distribution has a power-law tail.\nBesides, it has hierarchical organizations and exhibits disassortative mixing\npattern. We study the evolutionary version of the two types of games on it. It\nis found that enhancement and sustainment of cooperative behaviors are\nattributable to the underlying network topological organization. It is also\nshown that cooperators can survive when confronted with the invasion of\ndefectors throughout the entire ranges of parameters of both games. The\nevolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network\neffects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results\ncan help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0701323",
    "authors": [
      "Feng Fu",
      "Xiaojie Chen",
      "Lianghuan Liu",
      "Long Wang"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1016/j.physleta.2007.05.116",
    "journal_ref": "Physics Letters A{\\pounds}?371(1-2) (2007) 58-64",
    "title": "Social dilemmas in an online social network: the structure and evolution   of cooperation",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701323"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c1b1e393-316c-4b49-820b-5f27a1fe9841",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}