dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaOn the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter
| Authors | Jeremy Butterfield |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0406021 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0406021 |
Abstract
Some recent philosophical debate about persistence has focussed on an argument against perdurantism that discusses rotating perfectly homogeneous discs (the `rotating discs argument'; RDA). The argument has been mostly discussed by metaphysicians, though it appeals to ideas from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. After introducing the argument and emphasizing the relevance of physics (Sections 1 to 3), I review some metaphysicians' replies to the argument (Section 4). Thereafter, I argue for three main conclusions. They all arise from the fact, emphasized in Section 2, that classical mechanics (non-relativistic as well as relativistic) is both more subtle, and more problematic, than philosophers generally realize. The main conclusion is that the RDA can be defeated (Section 6 onwards). Namely, by the perdurantist taking objects in classical mechanics (whether point-particles or continuous bodies) to have only temporally extended, i.e. non-instantaneous, temporal parts: which immediately blocks the RDA. Admittedly, this version of perdurantism defines persistence in a weaker sense of `definition' than {\em pointilliste} versions that aim to define persistence assuming only instantaneous temporal parts. But I argue that temporally extended temporal parts are supported by both classical and quantum mechanics.
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"abstract": "Some recent philosophical debate about persistence has focussed on an\nargument against perdurantism that discusses rotating perfectly homogeneous\ndiscs (the `rotating discs argument\u0027; RDA). The argument has been mostly\ndiscussed by metaphysicians, though it appeals to ideas from classical\nmechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the\nperspective of the philosophy of physics.\n After introducing the argument and emphasizing the relevance of physics\n(Sections 1 to 3), I review some metaphysicians\u0027 replies to the argument\n(Section 4). Thereafter, I argue for three main conclusions. They all arise\nfrom the fact, emphasized in Section 2, that classical mechanics\n(non-relativistic as well as relativistic) is both more subtle, and more\nproblematic, than philosophers generally realize.\n The main conclusion is that the RDA can be defeated (Section 6 onwards).\nNamely, by the perdurantist taking objects in classical mechanics (whether\npoint-particles or continuous bodies) to have only temporally extended, i.e.\nnon-instantaneous, temporal parts: which immediately blocks the RDA.\nAdmittedly, this version of perdurantism defines persistence in a weaker sense\nof `definition\u0027 than {\\em pointilliste} versions that aim to define persistence\nassuming only instantaneous temporal parts. But I argue that temporally\nextended temporal parts are supported by both classical and quantum mechanics.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0406021",
"authors": [
"Jeremy Butterfield"
],
"categories": [
"physics.class-ph",
"physics.gen-ph"
],
"title": "On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0406021"
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