{
  "annotation_id": "5e95289c-ff1c-4085-b017-89632966ecb5",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:11.173000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:11.173000Z",
  "file_hash": "22ddaa950375ada9a3c989142c7ceb3bb5f5d4c2a3fca8a67d2d8f18a8ebba90",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The definition of preferences assigned to individuals is a concept that\nconcerns many disciplines, from economics, with the search of an acceptable\noutcome for an ensemble of individuals, to decision making an analysis of vote\nsystems. We are concerned in the phenomena of good selection and economic\nfairness. In Arrow\u0027s theorem this situation is expressed as the impossibility\nof aggregate preferences among individuals falling down into some unfairness\nstate. This situation was also analyzed in a previous model in a network of\nindividuals with a random allocation. Both analysis are based on static\npreferences.\n  In a real society the individuals are confronted to information exchange\nwhich can modify the way that they think. Also, the preference formation of\neach individual is influenced by this exchange. This consideration reveals why\nthe actual theory is not able to make an accurate analysis of the influence of\nthe individual, or cluster of individuals, in the fairness state. The aim of\nthis investigation is to consider the coupling of two systems, one for the\nformation of preferences and a second where an allocation of goods is done in\nan evolutionary environment.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0609100",
    "authors": [
      "Elena Ramirez Barrios",
      "Juan G. Diaz Ochoa"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph",
      "q-fin.GN"
    ],
    "title": "Fairness State with Plastic Preferences",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0609100"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "505ea652-0d55-4fe3-b6ae-fcc131124a24",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}