{
  "annotation_id": "5bc6e2c7-ba37-40fc-b94f-34334b578a1a",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:38.121000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:38.121000Z",
  "file_hash": "d916f5c7d4fca6f3bd8124b3687dda7d32d92df935df708cf1a4f1d704c6bd38",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The claim of quantum cryptography has always been that it can provide\nprotocols that are unconditionally secure, that is, for which the security does\nnot depend on any restriction on the time, space or technology available to the\ncheaters. We show that this claim does not hold for any quantum bit commitment\nprotocol. Since many cryptographic tasks use bit commitment as a basic\nprimitive, this result implies a severe setback for quantum cryptography. The\nmodel used encompasses all reasonable implementations of quantum bit commitment\nprotocols in which the participants have not met before, including those that\nmake use of the theory of special relativity.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9605044",
    "authors": [
      "Dominic Mayers"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.78.3414",
    "title": "Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9605044"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "e1cc8f04-0df4-4494-9c73-bb2606d0683a",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}