{
  "annotation_id": "58fac888-8d51-486b-a184-d869464d50bf",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:46.132000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:46.132000Z",
  "file_hash": "148f33f457a0f5fdbf614b8170dd968b85ad97bf68a9931c60b4f1036f0c5fd2",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We give a proof that entanglement purification, even with noisy apparatus, is\nsufficient to disentangle an eavesdropper (Eve) from the communication channel.\nOur proof applies to all possible attacks (individual and coherent). Due to the\nquantum nature of the entanglement purification protocol, it is also possible\nto use the obtained quantum channel for secure transmission of quantum\ninformation.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0108060",
    "authors": [
      "Hans Aschauer",
      "Hans J. Briegel"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1140/epjd/e20020021",
    "title": "Entanglement purification with noisy apparatus can be used to factor out   an eavesdropper",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0108060"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "89a8403c-ad45-4dc5-8807-6521f2e60d72",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}