{
  "annotation_id": "5706d292-facd-455d-a2cc-cb78599fb4a6",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:09.594000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:09.594000Z",
  "file_hash": "1a2d3b164fe70b40fd1def267dc6700787a6b55ef43b05718035025fa691013e",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Security bounds for key distribution protocols using coherent and squeezed\nstates and homodyne measurements are presented. These bounds refer to (i)\ngeneral attacks and (ii) collective attacks where Eve interacts individually\nwith the sent states, but delays her measurement until the end of the\nreconciliation process. For the case of a lossy line and coherent states, it is\nfirst proven that a secure key distribution is possible up to 1.9 dB of losses.\nFor the second scenario, the security bounds are the same as for the completely\nincoherent attack.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0407149",
    "authors": [
      "Miguel Navascues",
      "Antonio Acin"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.020505",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 020505 (2005)",
    "title": "Security bounds for continuous variables quantum key distribution",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407149"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "b0c86e1e-b1d2-4e1c-88d5-9f8c7d38166b",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}