{
  "annotation_id": "4e5955e7-65a8-4284-a50f-b98a4e7abf10",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:38.803000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:38.803000Z",
  "file_hash": "5f09f7974986535028d71e83ad918e279acfdb14ad0b954cdfcab3e30489933a",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Unconditionally secure two-party bit commitment based solely on the\nprinciples of quantum mechanics (without exploiting special relativistic\nsignalling constraints, or principles of general relativity or thermodynamics)\nhas been shown to be impossible, but the claim is repeatedly challenged. The\nquantum bit commitment theorem is reviewed here and the central conceptual\npoint, that an `Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen\u0027 attack or cheating strategy can always\nbe applied, is clarified. The question of whether following such a cheating\nstrategy can ever be disadvantageous to the cheater is considered and answered\nin the negative. There is, indeed, no loophole in the theorem.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0007090",
    "authors": [
      "Jeffrey Bub"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1023/A:1017597528026",
    "journal_ref": "Found. Phys. 31 (2001) 735",
    "title": "The quantum bit commitment theorem",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0007090"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "48714426-a6c3-44b3-86fe-7c9eb9097f2a",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}