{
  "annotation_id": "4baf8ff7-e63e-4bef-87b8-d99e99ab6197",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:17.893000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:17.893000Z",
  "file_hash": "01bad664139147c65c447b462df19d8d7b1503cd24daabb0793d7da086676d6f",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We propose a model for evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies $A$,\n$B$ and $C$ in the framework of Moran process in finite populations. The model\ncan be described as a stochastic process which can be numerically computed from\na system of linear equations. Furthermore, to capture the feature of the\nevolutionary process, we define two essential variables, the {\\em global} and\nthe {\\em local} fixation probability. If the {\\em global} fixation probability\nof strategy $A$ exceeds the neutral fixation probability, the selection favors\n$A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ no matter what the initial ratio of $B$ to $C$ is.\nSimilarly, if the {\\em local} fixation probability of $A$ exceeds the neutral\none, the selection favors $A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ only in some appropriate\ninitial ratios of $B$ to $C$. Besides, using our model, the famous game with\nAllC, AllD and TFT is analyzed. Meanwhile, we find that a single individual TFT\ncould invade the entire population under proper conditions.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0701315",
    "authors": [
      "Jing Wang",
      "Feng Fu",
      "Long Wang",
      "Guangming Xie"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies in finite populations",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701315"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "1a216d14-9b03-42f6-8dfa-24ec999a5439",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}