dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaTotally Secure Classical Communication Utilizing Johnson (-like) Noise and Kirchoff's Law
| Authors | Laszlo B. Kish |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0509136 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0509136 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062 |
| Journal | Physics Letters A 352 (March, 2006) 178-182 |
Abstract
An absolutely secure, fast, inexpensive, robust, maintenance-free and low-power- consumption communication is proposed. The states of the information bit are represented by two resistance values. The sender and the receiver have such resistors available and they randomly select and connect one of them to the channel at the beginning of each clock period. The thermal noise voltage and current can be observed but Kirchoff's law provides only a second-order equation. A secure bit is communicated when the actual resistance values at the sender's side and the receiver's side differ. Then the second order equation yields the two resistance values but the eavesdropper is unable to determine the actual locations of the resistors and to find out the state of the sender's bit. The receiver knows that the sender has the inverse of his bit, similarly to quantum entanglement. The eavesdropper can decode the message if, for each bits, she inject current in the wire and measures the voltage change and the current changes in the two directions. However, in this way she gets discovered by the very first bit she decodes. Instead of thermal noise, proper external noise generators should be used when the communication is not aimed to be stealth.
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"abstract": "An absolutely secure, fast, inexpensive, robust, maintenance-free and\nlow-power- consumption communication is proposed. The states of the information\nbit are represented by two resistance values. The sender and the receiver have\nsuch resistors available and they randomly select and connect one of them to\nthe channel at the beginning of each clock period. The thermal noise voltage\nand current can be observed but Kirchoff\u0027s law provides only a second-order\nequation. A secure bit is communicated when the actual resistance values at the\nsender\u0027s side and the receiver\u0027s side differ. Then the second order equation\nyields the two resistance values but the eavesdropper is unable to determine\nthe actual locations of the resistors and to find out the state of the sender\u0027s\nbit. The receiver knows that the sender has the inverse of his bit, similarly\nto quantum entanglement. The eavesdropper can decode the message if, for each\nbits, she inject current in the wire and measures the voltage change and the\ncurrent changes in the two directions. However, in this way she gets discovered\nby the very first bit she decodes. Instead of thermal noise, proper external\nnoise generators should be used when the communication is not aimed to be\nstealth.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0509136",
"authors": [
"Laszlo B. Kish"
],
"categories": [
"physics.class-ph",
"cs.CR",
"physics.gen-ph",
"quant-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062",
"journal_ref": "Physics Letters A 352 (March, 2006) 178-182",
"title": "Totally Secure Classical Communication Utilizing Johnson (-like) Noise and Kirchoff\u0027s Law",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0509136"
},
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