dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaResponse to Feng Hao's paper "Kish's key exchange scheme is insecure"
| Authors | Laszlo B. Kish |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0612193 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612193 |
Abstract
In a forthcoming paper in IEE Proceedings Information Security, Feng Hao claims that temperature inaccuracies make the key exchange scheme based on Kirchhoff Loop with Johnson-like Noise insecure. First we point out that this claim is irrelevant for the security of the idealized/mathematical communicator because it violates basic assumptions. Furthermore, in general practical applications, as it has been pointed out in the very first paper, the use of thermal noise is disadvantageous therefore the issue of temperature and its accuracy is unimportant even for the security of common practical realizations. It is important to emphasize that any deviation from the idealized scheme can lead to a finite level of security. Thus, if the above-mentioned author had stressed the inaccuracy of the resistor values; his claim would have been practically valid. However the impact of such systematic errors can be kept under control. Here we cite our relevant analysis (Phys. Lett. A 359, (2006) 741-744) of 1% voltage inaccuracy along the line due to wire resistance effects, which can be considered as a general result for inaccuracies of this order. The necessity to build a statistics to extract information during the properly chosen clock time leads to extremely poor eavesdropper statistics and this situation provides a good practical raw bit security that can be orders of magnitude beyond the raw bit security of idealized quantum communicators.
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"abstract": "In a forthcoming paper in IEE Proceedings Information Security, Feng Hao\nclaims that temperature inaccuracies make the key exchange scheme based on\nKirchhoff Loop with Johnson-like Noise insecure. First we point out that this\nclaim is irrelevant for the security of the idealized/mathematical communicator\nbecause it violates basic assumptions. Furthermore, in general practical\napplications, as it has been pointed out in the very first paper, the use of\nthermal noise is disadvantageous therefore the issue of temperature and its\naccuracy is unimportant even for the security of common practical realizations.\nIt is important to emphasize that any deviation from the idealized scheme can\nlead to a finite level of security. Thus, if the above-mentioned author had\nstressed the inaccuracy of the resistor values; his claim would have been\npractically valid. However the impact of such systematic errors can be kept\nunder control. Here we cite our relevant analysis (Phys. Lett. A 359, (2006)\n741-744) of 1% voltage inaccuracy along the line due to wire resistance\neffects, which can be considered as a general result for inaccuracies of this\norder. The necessity to build a statistics to extract information during the\nproperly chosen clock time leads to extremely poor eavesdropper statistics and\nthis situation provides a good practical raw bit security that can be orders of\nmagnitude beyond the raw bit security of idealized quantum communicators.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0612193",
"authors": [
"Laszlo B. Kish"
],
"categories": [
"physics.gen-ph",
"physics.data-an"
],
"title": "Response to Feng Hao\u0027s paper \"Kish\u0027s key exchange scheme is insecure\"",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0612193"
},
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