dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaUsing quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: a survey
| Authors | Romain Alléaume, Cyril Branciard, Jan Bouda, Thierry Debuisschert, Mehrdad Dianati, Nicolas Gisin, Mark Godfrey, Philippe Grangier, Thomas Langer, Norbert Lutkenhaus, Christian Monyk, Philippe Painchault, Momtchil Peev, Andreas Poppe, Thomas Pornin, John Rarity, Renato Renner, Gregoire Ribordy, Michel Riguidel, Louis Salvail, Andrew Shields, Harald Weinfurter, Anton Zeilinger |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0701168 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0701168 |
| Journal | Theoretical Computer Science, 560 (2014), pp. 62-81 |
| License | http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ |
Abstract
The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic viewpoint, is the ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of the established keys. As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can vary. It is therefore important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in security infrastructures, to analyze how QKD can be combined with other cryptographic primitives. The purpose of this survey article, which is mostly centered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We first review and compare the properties of the existing key establishment techniques, QKD being one of them. We then study more specifically two generic scenarios related to the practical use of QKD in cryptographic infrastructures: 1) using QKD as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher over a point-to-point link; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the objective of offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the constraints as well as the potential interest of using QKD in these contexts. We finally give an overview of challenges relative to the development of QKD technology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research.
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"abstract": "The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic\nviewpoint, is the ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of\nthe established keys. As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not\nprovide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established\nby QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for\nwhich the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can\nvary. It is therefore important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in\nsecurity infrastructures, to analyze how QKD can be combined with other\ncryptographic primitives. The purpose of this survey article, which is mostly\ncentered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We\nfirst review and compare the properties of the existing key establishment\ntechniques, QKD being one of them. We then study more specifically two generic\nscenarios related to the practical use of QKD in cryptographic infrastructures:\n1) using QKD as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher over a\npoint-to-point link; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the\nobjective of offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the\nconstraints as well as the potential interest of using QKD in these contexts.\nWe finally give an overview of challenges relative to the development of QKD\ntechnology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0701168",
"authors": [
"Romain All\u00e9aume",
"Cyril Branciard",
"Jan Bouda",
"Thierry Debuisschert",
"Mehrdad Dianati",
"Nicolas Gisin",
"Mark Godfrey",
"Philippe Grangier",
"Thomas Langer",
"Norbert Lutkenhaus",
"Christian Monyk",
"Philippe Painchault",
"Momtchil Peev",
"Andreas Poppe",
"Thomas Pornin",
"John Rarity",
"Renato Renner",
"Gregoire Ribordy",
"Michel Riguidel",
"Louis Salvail",
"Andrew Shields",
"Harald Weinfurter",
"Anton Zeilinger"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph",
"cs.CR",
"cs.IT",
"math.IT"
],
"journal_ref": "Theoretical Computer Science, 560 (2014), pp. 62-81",
"license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
"title": "Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: a survey",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0701168"
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