dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaSecure Communication Using Qubits
| Authors | Saied Hosseini-Khayat, Iman Marvian |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0503157 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0503157 |
| DOI | 10.1109/CIT.2006.164 |
| Journal | The Sixth IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology, 2006. Seoul, South Korea |
Abstract
A two-layer quantum protocol for secure transmission of data using qubits is presented. The protocol is an improvement over the BB84 QKD protocol. BB84, in conjunction with the one-time pad algorithm, has been shown to be unconditionally secure. However it suffers from two drawbacks: (1) Its security relies on the assumption that Alice's qubit source is perfect in the sense that it does not inadvertently emit multiple copies of the same qubit. A multi-qubit emission attack can be launched if this assumption is violated. (2) BB84 cannot transfer predetermined keys; the keys it can distribute are generated in the process. Our protocol does not have these drawbacks. As in BB84, our protocol requires an authenticated public channel so as to detect an intruder's interaction with the quantum channel, but unlike in symmetric-key cryptography, the confidentiality of transmitted data does not rely on a shared secret key.
{
"annotation_id": "43b5ab9a-3001-43ac-a9b5-3b09bcca34b6",
"date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:17.096000Z",
"date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:17.096000Z",
"file_hash": "dfa71f3eeffa1759e50a7c3dfe0a5b907d392450be77484b074aea602ea62971",
"private": false,
"record": {
"abstract": "A two-layer quantum protocol for secure transmission of data using qubits is\npresented. The protocol is an improvement over the BB84 QKD protocol. BB84, in\nconjunction with the one-time pad algorithm, has been shown to be\nunconditionally secure. However it suffers from two drawbacks: (1) Its security\nrelies on the assumption that Alice\u0027s qubit source is perfect in the sense that\nit does not inadvertently emit multiple copies of the same qubit. A multi-qubit\nemission attack can be launched if this assumption is violated. (2) BB84 cannot\ntransfer predetermined keys; the keys it can distribute are generated in the\nprocess. Our protocol does not have these drawbacks.\n As in BB84, our protocol requires an authenticated public channel so as to\ndetect an intruder\u0027s interaction with the quantum channel, but unlike in\nsymmetric-key cryptography, the confidentiality of transmitted data does not\nrely on a shared secret key.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0503157",
"authors": [
"Saied Hosseini-Khayat",
"Iman Marvian"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph",
"cs.CR"
],
"doi": "10.1109/CIT.2006.164",
"journal_ref": "The Sixth IEEE International Conference on Computer and\n Information Technology, 2006. Seoul, South Korea",
"title": "Secure Communication Using Qubits",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0503157"
},
"schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
"source": {
"execution_id": "7851c36d-1345-420a-be57-b5b0a1bb508f",
"id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
"type": "Model",
"variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
"version": "0.1.0"
},
"user_id": 1000002
}