{
  "annotation_id": "43036c13-1351-473e-b47e-f63a5d70a932",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:00:28.963000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:00:28.963000Z",
  "file_hash": "e79fa1fc984bee0499181f6068069e45d8f79c832df99633c52c27947fe725f6",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "A number of issues related to measurement show that self-consistency is\nlacking in quantum mechanics as this theory has been generally understood. Each\nissue is presented as a point in this paper. Each point can be resolved by\nincorporating a cognitive component in quantum mechanics. Measurement in\nquantum mechanics involves the meaning of the physical circumstances of the\nexperiment. This meaning is in part independent of what traditionally are\nconsidered purely physical considerations.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0002049",
    "authors": [
      "D. M. Snyder"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.gen-ph"
    ],
    "title": "On the Nature of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0002049"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "9e8f0976-d86b-4245-87e4-be607aacec0b",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}