{
  "annotation_id": "4133a2d8-2c12-4962-bf5b-09d0772e7c8c",
  "date_created": "2026-02-17T05:53:11.625000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-02-17T05:53:11.625000Z",
  "file_hash": "4791567a07d9b577c90c0f1fb6bac069f0aac07524ce48e6c4b4830157fbce71",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "The Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) cryptosystem was selected for standardization in the fourth round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project. The goal of the PQC project is to standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we present a single-trace Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack against HQC that exploits power consumption leakage that occurs during polynomial multiplication performed at the beginning of HQC decryption. Using the ChipWhisperer-Lite board, we perform and evaluate the attack, achieving a 99.69% success rate over 10 000 attack attempts. We also propose various countermeasures against the attack and evaluate their time complexity.",
    "arxiv_id": "2601.07634",
    "authors": [
      "Pavel Velek",
      "Tom\u00e1\u0161 Rabas",
      "Ji\u0159\u00ed Bu\u010dek"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "cs.CR"
    ],
    "license": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/",
    "title": "Simple Power Analysis of Polynomial Multiplication in HQC",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.07634",
    "version": "v1"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c4016c16-de9d-4f05-95c8-c57c2b32a7c8",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-01-17",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}