dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaSecurity Aspects of Practical Quantum Cryptography
| Authors | Gilles Brassard, Norbert Lütkenhaus, Tal Mor, Barry C. Sanders |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/9911054 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9911054 |
| DOI | 10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.1330 |
| Journal | Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol 85, 1330-1333 (2000). |
Abstract
The use of quantum bits (qubits) in cryptography holds the promise of secure cryptographic quantum key distribution schemes. Unfortunately, the implemented schemes can be totally insecure. We provide a thorough investigation of security issues for practical quantum key distribution, taking into account channel losses, a realistic detection process, and modifications of the ``qubits'' sent from the sender to the receiver. We first show that even quantum key distribution with perfect qubits cannot be achieved over long distances when fixed channel losses and fixed dark count errors are taken into account. Then we show that existing experimental schemes (based on ``weak-pulse'') are usually totally insecure. Finally we show that parametric downconversion offers enhanced performance compared to its weak coherent pulse counterpart.
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"abstract": "The use of quantum bits (qubits) in cryptography holds the promise of secure\ncryptographic quantum key distribution schemes. Unfortunately, the implemented\nschemes can be totally insecure. We provide a thorough investigation of\nsecurity issues for practical quantum key distribution, taking into account\nchannel losses, a realistic detection process, and modifications of the\n``qubits\u0027\u0027 sent from the sender to the receiver. We first show that even\nquantum key distribution with perfect qubits cannot be achieved over long\ndistances when fixed channel losses and fixed dark count errors are taken into\naccount. Then we show that existing experimental schemes (based on\n``weak-pulse\u0027\u0027) are usually totally insecure. Finally we show that parametric\ndownconversion offers enhanced performance compared to its weak coherent pulse\ncounterpart.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9911054",
"authors": [
"Gilles Brassard",
"Norbert L\u00fctkenhaus",
"Tal Mor",
"Barry C. Sanders"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.1330",
"journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol 85, 1330-1333 (2000).",
"title": "Security Aspects of Practical Quantum Cryptography",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9911054"
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