dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaConsciousness and the Wigner's friend problem
| Authors | Bernard d'Espagnat |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0402121 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402121 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10701-005-8656-1 |
| Journal | Foundations of Physics 35 (2005) 1943 |
Abstract
It is generally agreed that decoherence theory is, if not a complete answer, at least a great step forward towards a solution of the quantum measurement problem. It is shown here however that in the cases in which a sentient being is explicitly assumed to take cognizance of the outcome the reasons we have for judging this way are not totally consistent, so that the question has to be considered anew. It is pointed out that the way the Broglie-Bohm model solves the riddle suggests a possible clue, consisting in assuming that even very simple systems may have some sort of a proto-consciousness, but that their ``internal states of consciousness'' are not predictive. It is, next, easily shown that if we imagine the systems get larger, in virtue of decoherence their internal states of consciousness progressively gain in predictive value. So that, for macro-systems, they may be identified (in practice) with the predictive states of consciousness on which we ground our observational predictions. The possibilities of carrying over this idea to standard quantum mechanics are then investigated. Conditions of conceptual consistency are considered and found rather strict, and, finally, two solutions emerge, differing conceptually very much from one another but in both of which the, possibly non-predictive, generalized internal states of consciousness play a crucial role.
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"abstract": "It is generally agreed that decoherence theory is, if not a complete answer,\nat least a great step forward towards a solution of the quantum measurement\nproblem. It is shown here however that in the cases in which a sentient being\nis explicitly assumed to take cognizance of the outcome the reasons we have for\njudging this way are not totally consistent, so that the question has to be\nconsidered anew. It is pointed out that the way the Broglie-Bohm model solves\nthe riddle suggests a possible clue, consisting in assuming that even very\nsimple systems may have some sort of a proto-consciousness, but that their\n``internal states of consciousness\u0027\u0027 are not predictive. It is, next, easily\nshown that if we imagine the systems get larger, in virtue of decoherence their\ninternal states of consciousness progressively gain in predictive value. So\nthat, for macro-systems, they may be identified (in practice) with the\npredictive states of consciousness on which we ground our observational\npredictions. The possibilities of carrying over this idea to standard quantum\nmechanics are then investigated. Conditions of conceptual consistency are\nconsidered and found rather strict, and, finally, two solutions emerge,\ndiffering conceptually very much from one another but in both of which the,\npossibly non-predictive, generalized internal states of consciousness play a\ncrucial role.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0402121",
"authors": [
"Bernard d\u0027Espagnat"
],
"categories": [
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"doi": "10.1007/s10701-005-8656-1",
"journal_ref": "Foundations of Physics 35 (2005) 1943",
"title": "Consciousness and the Wigner\u0027s friend problem",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402121"
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