{
  "annotation_id": "396ea548-921a-4fe2-bb87-3b390b4a6d20",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:34.816000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:34.816000Z",
  "file_hash": "0f8cc5ab7c43fb3816c6b02c851c24e228a642914b8cdfbc0caff2336f0b1b1d",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating\nindividuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a\nmigration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player\ngames with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the\npopulation is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where\nplayers are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our\ndynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of\nattraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard\nreplication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play\nthe efficient strategy.",
    "arxiv_id": "q-bio/0703057",
    "authors": [
      "Jacek Miekisz",
      "Tadeusz Platkowski"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "q-bio.PE"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "J. Theor. Biol. 237: 363 - 368 (2005)",
    "title": "Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0703057"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "73d8dcbf-b078-4f2c-b378-41ae931f19ee",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}