{
  "annotation_id": "35159547-56d6-4abe-8053-5a6dc0168609",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:23.884000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:23.884000Z",
  "file_hash": "9378a009f150cbe718302eecf13a22ccb2d075586bc71c080b8b1ca1f10580f7",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Provable entanglement has been shown to be a necessary precondition for\nunconditionally secure key generation in the context of quantum cryptographic\nprotocols. We estimate the maximal threshold disturbance up to which the two\nlegitimate users can prove the presence of quantum correlations in their data,\nin the context of the four- and six-state quantum key-distribution protocols,\nunder the assumption of coherent attacks. Moreover, we investigate the\nconditions under which an eavesdropper can saturate these bounds, by means of\nincoherent and two-qubit coherent attacks. A direct connection between\nentanglement distillation and classical advantage distillation is also\npresented.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0511218",
    "authors": [
      "G. M. Nikolopoulos",
      "A. Khalique",
      "G. Alber"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1140/epjd/e2005-00314-3",
    "journal_ref": "Eur. Phys. J. D 37, 441 (2006)",
    "title": "Provable entanglement and information cost for qubit-based quantum   key-distribution protocols",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0511218"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c54147d2-d22e-4140-99d0-023504d9a626",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}