{
  "annotation_id": "34c022b7-f25a-4d14-b238-0f32b3e1d6ad",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:20.704000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:20.704000Z",
  "file_hash": "747d476894892aa354fcd47b921b9b861560811ce67c0453547703c9e9d9586f",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Any Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol consists first of sequences of\nmeasurements that produce some correlation between classical data. We show that\nthese correlation data must violate some Bell inequality in order to contain\ndistillable secrecy, if not they could be produced by quantum measurements\nperformed on a separable state of larger dimension. We introduce a new QKD\nprotocol and prove its security against any individual attack by an adversary\nonly limited by the no-signaling condition.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0510094",
    "authors": [
      "Antonio Acin",
      "Nicolas Gisin",
      "Lluis Masanes"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.97.120405",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 120405 (2006)",
    "title": "From Bell\u0027s Theorem to Secure Quantum Key Distribution",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0510094"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "88bc5df7-063f-4145-95e3-12865bf02b1e",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}