{
  "annotation_id": "30e9ea35-e7c7-4e2b-a4a1-c3485d475698",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:45.205000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:45.205000Z",
  "file_hash": "ed8f1d64496300b7f506ff85f943f2746933d1501a8bc7fedaa76f2bd249cf56",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "It has been recently shown by Mayers that no bit commitment scheme is secure\nif the participants have unlimited computational power and technology. However\nit was noticed that a secure protocol could be obtained by forcing the cheater\nto perform a measurement. Similar situations had been encountered previously in\nthe design of Quantum Oblivious Transfer. The question is whether a classical\nbit commitment could be used for this specific purpose. We demonstrate that,\nsurprisingly, classical unconditionally concealing bit commitments do not help.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9806031",
    "authors": [
      "Gilles Brassard",
      "Claude Cr\u00e9peau",
      "Dominic Mayers",
      "Louis Salvail"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Defeating classical bit commitments with a quantum computer",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9806031"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "6a69c57d-9e96-4e41-aa6e-3feae77fccb9",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}