{
  "annotation_id": "2df162f2-88e0-4016-8eb0-95106677ceac",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:37.944000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:37.944000Z",
  "file_hash": "adca42b549fb48616c39557269f235708bfb9cf54f518d6b4576188c9b01a942",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We prove the unconditional security of a quantum key distribution (QKD)\nprotocol on a noisy channel against the most general attack allowed by quantum\nphysics. We use the fact that in a previous paper we have reduced the proof of\nthe unconditionally security of this QKD protocol to a proof that a\ncorresponding Quantum String Oblivious Transfer (String-QOT) protocol would be\nunconditionally secure against Bob if implemented on top of an unconditionally\nsecure bit commitment scheme. We prove a lemma that extends a security proof\ngiven by Yao for a (one bit) QOT protocol to this String-QOT protocol. This\nresult and the reduction mentioned above implies the unconditional security of\nour QKD protocol despite our previous proof that unconditionally secure bit\ncommitment schemes are impossible.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9606003",
    "authors": [
      "Dominic Mayers"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Quantum Key Distribution and String Oblivious Transfer in Noisy Channels",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9606003"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "e9ee12ed-cee2-4a11-877d-ef6e9fa702e5",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}