dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaEquilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players
| Authors | Jacek Miekisz |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | q-bio/0409026 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409026 |
Abstract
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.
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"abstract": "We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games.\nOur models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one,\nwhere a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a\nrisk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that\nindividuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against\naverage strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the\nlong-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.",
"arxiv_id": "q-bio/0409026",
"authors": [
"Jacek Miekisz"
],
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"title": "Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409026"
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