{
  "annotation_id": "2a41bd3d-429a-4814-b21d-b534656a96c1",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:23.828000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:23.828000Z",
  "file_hash": "795484d554394b50ec92f3584224eda06006401ac7e25e98c4db7164ebf0b65d",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Many papers proved the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) system, in\nthe asymptotic framework. The degree of the security has not been discussed in\nthe finite coding-length framework, sufficiently. However, to guarantee any\nimplemented QKD system requires, it is needed to evaluate a protocol with a\nfinite coding-length. For this purpose, we derive a tight upper bound of the\neavesdropper\u0027s information. This bound is better than existing bounds. We also\nobtain the exponential rate of the eavesdropper\u0027s information. Further, we\napproximate our bound by using the normal distribution.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0602113",
    "authors": [
      "Masahito Hayashi"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.74.022307",
    "journal_ref": "Physical Review A, Vol. 74, 022307 (2006)",
    "title": "Practical Evaluation of Security for Quantum Key Distribution",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0602113"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "38e61d4d-bcf9-49c6-94b8-d11cacb258ae",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}