{
  "annotation_id": "2a2378da-3922-4a59-9711-87c3d53039bc",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:00.211000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:00.211000Z",
  "file_hash": "687bf444ed1a471f6f0392a10b3f7f8018592c7f0ad52ce554a1d6985486620b",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We discuss the security implications of noise for quantum coin tossing\nprotocols. We find that if quantum error correction can be used, so that noise\nlevels can be made arbitrarily small, then reasonable security conditions for\ncoin tossing can be framed so that results from the noiseless case will\ncontinue to hold. If, however, error correction is not available (as is the\ncase with present day technology), and significant noise is present, then\ntossing a single coin becomes problematic. In this case, we are led to consider\nrandom n-bit string generation in the presence of noise, rather than\nsingle-shot coin tossing. We introduce precise security criteria for n-bit\nstring generation and describe an explicit protocol that could be implemented\nwith present day technology. In general, a cheater can exploit noise in order\nto bias coins to their advantage. We derive explicit upper bounds on the\naverage bias achievable by a cheater for given noise levels.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0303182",
    "authors": [
      "Jonathan Barrett",
      "Serge Massar"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.69.022322",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 69, 022322 (2004)",
    "title": "Quantum coin tossing and bit-string generation in the presence of noise",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0303182"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "a047617c-3580-445e-8d19-2d320d8e29bc",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}