{
  "annotation_id": "25950ff1-d5f1-4a63-8bd2-0041d0e6ff4e",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:20.023000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:20.023000Z",
  "file_hash": "832ad7338a9b8720b1788a693c9112d9525837cf5def9da96154f268953b0fe7",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations\nin detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an\neavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be\nthe timing of the incoming pulse. When the eavesdropper sends short pulses\nusing the appropriate timing so that the two gated detectors in Bob\u0027s setup\nhave different efficiencies, the security of quantum key distribution can be\ncompromised. Specifically, we show for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)\nprotocol that if the efficiency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some\nvalue of the control parameter gets large enough (roughly 15:1 or larger), Eve\ncan construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit error rate\nlower than 11%. We also derive a general security bound as a function of the\ndetector sensitivity mismatch for the BB84 protocol. Experimental data for two\ndifferent detectors are presented, and protection measures against this attack\nare discussed.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0511032",
    "authors": [
      "Vadim Makarov",
      "Andrey Anisimov",
      "Johannes Skaar"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.74.022313",
    "journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006)",
    "title": "Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum   cryptosystems",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0511032"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "2fe64c49-c6dd-46b4-a3d8-faf2b199f10a",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}