{
  "annotation_id": "21bd5b5f-b1f9-4a60-a962-b0076148484d",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:10.860000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:10.860000Z",
  "file_hash": "cca7125300c76936d46c601170c1fc0d848f582dffa56327700845ab5e077c3a",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with\ndifferent opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed.\nVarious games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion\nformation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are\nequals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics\nproposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined,\nsuch that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can\nnot interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different\ninclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the\nothers. In this way, we obtain the so-called ``Stubborn individuals and\nOrators\u0027\u0027 (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which\nthe threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We\nexplore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose\nfurther generalizations that can be implemented.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0609127",
    "authors": [
      "Alessandro Di Mare",
      "Vito Latora"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.soc-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1142/S012918310701139X",
    "title": "Opinion formation models based on game theory",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0609127"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "c515c974-d148-4d33-9550-c9a10d82ae2a",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}