{
  "annotation_id": "20f13663-0295-46cd-ad5c-6f2c129fa876",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:00:46.598000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:00:46.598000Z",
  "file_hash": "a448a8cd8ba9165f21273dae0470d20433ea4767b29ba2da6ca597e93bf48ba0",
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  "record": {
    "abstract": "The Mind-Body Problem, which constitutes the starting point for a large part\nof the speculations about consciousness and conscious experience, can be\nre-stated in an equivalent way, using the `brain duplication\u0027 argument\ndescribed in this paper. If we assume that consciousness follows from a\npeculiar organization of physical matter and energy, namely that it does not\ntranscend physical reality, then the brain duplication argument gives a\npossible interesting physical characterization of the mind: namely, a sort of\nextensive interdependence of the brain with the whole surrounding physical\nworld in giving rise to consciousness.",
    "arxiv_id": "physics/0310154",
    "authors": [
      "Germano D\u0027Abramo"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "physics.gen-ph"
    ],
    "journal_ref": "NeuroQuantology (2007) Vol. 5, Issue 4, Page 392-395.",
    "title": "A thought experiment on consciousness",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0310154"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "a14eef27-b87c-4fc8-89bb-3ceaa4012fd5",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}