{
  "annotation_id": "20aac97a-ebaa-45d8-9a52-5e30a001a43c",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:00.269000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:00.269000Z",
  "file_hash": "c446b0821fd57dff6be28244244592e56bbc3aab5d0e14907e7c8250a3338060",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We present a protocol for quantum cryptography in which the data obtained for\nmismatched bases are used in full for the purpose of quantum state tomography.\nEavesdropping on the quantum channel is seriously impeded by requiring that the\noutcome of the tomography is consistent with unbiased noise in the channel. We\nstudy the incoherent eavesdropping attacks that are still permissible and\nestablish under which conditions a secure cryptographic key can be generated.\nThe whole analysis is carried out for channels that transmit quantum systems of\nany finite dimension.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0305018",
    "authors": [
      "Yeong Cherng Liang",
      "Dagomir Kaszlikowski",
      "Berthold-Georg Englert",
      "Leong Chuan Kwek",
      "C. H. Oh"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.68.022324",
    "journal_ref": "Physical Review A, vol. 68, art. 022324 (2003)",
    "title": "Tomographic Quantum Cryptography",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0305018"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "192aaf56-4fef-46ea-96da-1a3ff36993ac",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}