{
  "annotation_id": "1fc1452a-3ead-4804-854d-590aa457e3d0",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:06.450000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:06.450000Z",
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  "record": {
    "abstract": "Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as\nthe empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to\nproperly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand\nthe meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has\nexcited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of\nquantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist\nconception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a\nlogical or Bayesian conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox\nand Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks\nconcerning the implications for the concept of physical reality.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0402015",
    "authors": [
      "D. M. Appleby"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1007/s10701-004-2014-6",
    "journal_ref": "Found. Phys. 35, 627 (2005)",
    "title": "Facts, Values and Quanta",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402015"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "dd765ba0-0c2d-42bd-ad3d-9b4c4dbc3d1c",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}