dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaPrisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure
| Authors | Julia Alonso, Ariel Fernandez, Hugo Fort |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | physics/0512187 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0512187 |
| DOI | 10.1088/1742-5468/2006/06/P06013 |
Abstract
We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.
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"abstract": "We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma cellular\nautomata, introduced by Nowak and May \\cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the\nenvironment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that\nindividuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing\nindispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this\nenvironment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour\nof the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if\n$U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}\u003cU_{min}$ an\nindividual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one\nused by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution\nof cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for\nexample, when the sucker\u0027s payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual\ndefection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which\nthe selective rule is supplemented with a \"win-stay, lose-shift\" criterion. The\ncluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found\npower-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.",
"arxiv_id": "physics/0512187",
"authors": [
"Julia Alonso",
"Ariel Fernandez",
"Hugo Fort"
],
"categories": [
"physics.soc-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1088/1742-5468/2006/06/P06013",
"title": "Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0512187"
},
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