{
  "annotation_id": "191d5855-6984-4f85-8e90-498ccdd29869",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:34.936000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:34.936000Z",
  "file_hash": "0569d48874606af8361c89ed4213bbc5c8cf52de9309d951f229790e4339b2df",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a\npopulation interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that\neliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of\ninteraction and selection leads to dramatic changes in the outcome of\nevolution. Examples include the selection of the inefficient strategy in the\nHarmony and Stag-Hunt games, and the disappearance of the coexistence state in\nthe Snowdrift game. Our results hold for any population size and in the\npresence of a background of fitness.",
    "arxiv_id": "q-bio/0606033",
    "authors": [
      "Carlos P. Roca",
      "Jose A. Cuesta y Angel Sanchez"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "q-bio.PE",
      "math.DS",
      "nlin.AO",
      "physics.soc-ph",
      "q-bio.QM"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.97.158701",
    "title": "Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0606033"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "11a5efd8-a27c-44bf-b4d8-e2f7ee590770",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}