dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaObjective probability and quantum fuzziness
| Authors | Ulrich Mohrhoff |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0703035 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0703035 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10701-008-9266-5 |
| Journal | Found. Phys. 39/2 (2009) 137-155 |
| License | http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ |
Abstract
This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the "objective preparations view" or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes...
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"abstract": "This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum\nmechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack\ncontaining a critique of the \"objective preparations view\" or OPV. It also aims\nto carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and\nproponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted,\nincluding the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to\nthe same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a\npreparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and\nproponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the\ncontinuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to\na false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or\nsubjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper\nviews the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement\nto whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities.\nThis makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable\nfeature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement\noutcomes...",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0703035",
"authors": [
"Ulrich Mohrhoff"
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"quant-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1007/s10701-008-9266-5",
"journal_ref": "Found. Phys. 39/2 (2009) 137-155",
"license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
"title": "Objective probability and quantum fuzziness",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0703035"
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