{
  "annotation_id": "16297adc-7853-4438-b32e-007c23a65fc4",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:09.594000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:09.594000Z",
  "file_hash": "c68cd55c842bb88484bf59572b4488f57af029f53e123c35c3924769a8df4525",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We present here an information theoretic study of Gaussian collective attacks\non the continuous variable key distribution protocols based on Gaussian\nmodulation of coherent states. These attacks, overlooked in previous security\nstudies, give a finite advantage to the eavesdropper in the experimentally\nrelevant lossy channel, but are not powerful enough to reduce the range of the\nreverse reconciliation protocols. Secret key rates are given for the ideal case\nwhere Bob performs optimal collective measurements, as well as for the\nrealistic cases where he performs homodyne or heterodyne measurements. We also\napply the generic security proof of Christiandl et. al. [quant-ph/0402131] to\nobtain unconditionally secure rates for these protocols.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0407148",
    "authors": [
      "Frederic Grosshans"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.020504",
    "title": "Collective attacks and unconditional security in continuous variable   quantum key distribution",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407148"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "6896368e-e25e-47aa-8989-7c0beb4d1b40",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}