{
  "annotation_id": "14cc84ea-92b0-4428-90d3-c71199e86b07",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:45.246000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:45.246000Z",
  "file_hash": "07ca3feae6f0c93d69027e4ee8ec9f2c38bf5db02dd3a96ae567dd680bf2238f",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Contrary to an oft-made claim, there can be observational distinctions (say\nfor the expansion of the universe or the cosmological constant) between\n\"single-history\" quantum theories and \"many-worlds\" quantum theories. The\ndistinctions occur when the number of observers is not uniquely predicted by\nthe theory. In single-history theories, each history is weighted simply by its\nquantum-mechanical probability, but in many-worlds theories in which random\nobservations are considered, there should also be the weighting by the numbers\nor amounts of observations occurring in each history.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9904004",
    "authors": [
      "Don N. Page"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph",
      "gr-qc",
      "hep-th"
    ],
    "title": "Observational Consequences of Many-Worlds Quantum Theory",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9904004"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "090f1c9a-33dd-4342-a9b9-380f0c525f06",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}