dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaUnconditionally secure key distillation from multi-photons
| Authors | Kiyoshi Tamaki, Hoi-Kwong Lo |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0412035 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412035 |
| DOI | 10.1103/PhysRevA.73.010302 |
| Journal | Phys. Rev. A. 73, 010302(R) (2006) |
Abstract
In this paper, we prove that the unconditionally secure key can be surprisingly extracted from {\it multi}-photon emission part in the photon polarization-based QKD. One example is shown by explicitly proving that one can indeed generate an unconditionally secure key from Alice's two-photon emission part in ``Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulses implementations'' proposed by V. Scarani {\it et al.,} in Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 92}, 057901 (2004), which is called SARG04. This protocol uses the same four states as in BB84 and differs only in the classical post-processing protocol. It is, thus, interesting to see how the classical post-processing of quantum key distribution might qualitatively change its security. We also show that one can generate an unconditionally secure key from the single to the four-photon part in a generalized SARG04 that uses six states. Finally, we also compare the bit error rate threshold of these protocols with the one in BB84 and the original six-state protocol assuming a depolarizing channel.
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"abstract": "In this paper, we prove that the unconditionally secure key can be\nsurprisingly extracted from {\\it multi}-photon emission part in the photon\npolarization-based QKD. One example is shown by explicitly proving that one can\nindeed generate an unconditionally secure key from Alice\u0027s two-photon emission\npart in ``Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting\nattacks for weak laser pulses implementations\u0027\u0027 proposed by V. Scarani {\\it et\nal.,} in Phys. Rev. Lett. {\\bf 92}, 057901 (2004), which is called SARG04. This\nprotocol uses the same four states as in BB84 and differs only in the classical\npost-processing protocol. It is, thus, interesting to see how the classical\npost-processing of quantum key distribution might qualitatively change its\nsecurity. We also show that one can generate an unconditionally secure key from\nthe single to the four-photon part in a generalized SARG04 that uses six\nstates. Finally, we also compare the bit error rate threshold of these\nprotocols with the one in BB84 and the original six-state protocol assuming a\ndepolarizing channel.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0412035",
"authors": [
"Kiyoshi Tamaki",
"Hoi-Kwong Lo"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1103/PhysRevA.73.010302",
"journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. A. 73, 010302(R) (2006)",
"title": "Unconditionally secure key distillation from multi-photons",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412035"
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