{
  "annotation_id": "0e3ca40d-1c62-4d3b-a4f5-b2b4a0dc4422",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:44.804000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:44.804000Z",
  "file_hash": "495129e7260b0c2d6c7d7a18dd0776bb462c5239bb4c0309b9fffcf1a2a800aa",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "We present a quantum digital signature scheme whose security is based on\nfundamental principles of quantum physics. It allows a sender (Alice) to sign a\nmessage in such a way that the signature can be validated by a number of\ndifferent people, and all will agree either that the message came from Alice or\nthat it has been tampered with. To accomplish this task, each recipient of the\nmessage must have a copy of Alice\u0027s \"public key,\" which is a set of quantum\nstates whose exact identity is known only to Alice. Quantum public keys are\nmore difficult to deal with than classical public keys: for instance, only a\nlimited number of copies can be in circulation, or the scheme becomes insecure.\nHowever, in exchange for this price, we achieve unconditionally secure digital\nsignatures. Sending an m-bit message uses up O(m) quantum bits for each\nrecipient of the public key. We briefly discuss how to securely distribute\nquantum public keys, and show the signature scheme is absolutely secure using\none method of key distribution. The protocol provides a model for importing the\nideas of classical public key cryptography into the quantum world.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0105032",
    "authors": [
      "Daniel Gottesman",
      "Isaac Chuang"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Quantum Digital Signatures",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105032"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "a5b14426-d8e9-4845-8436-14ed54152b45",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}