dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaNo Signalling and Quantum Key Distribution
| Authors | Jonathan Barrett, Lucien Hardy, Adrian Kent |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0405101 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0405101 |
| DOI | 10.1103/PhysRevLett.95.010503 |
| Journal | Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 010503 (2005) |
Abstract
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use post-quantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a post-quantum eavesdropper who is limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signalling. The security of the scheme stems from violation of a Bell inequality.
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"abstract": "Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against\neavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically\ninteresting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to\nprove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be\nbased on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical\ninterest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a\nscientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use\npost-quantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without\nnecessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security\nproofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against\ngeneral attacks by a post-quantum eavesdropper who is limited only by the\nimpossibility of superluminal signalling. The security of the scheme stems from\nviolation of a Bell inequality.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0405101",
"authors": [
"Jonathan Barrett",
"Lucien Hardy",
"Adrian Kent"
],
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"doi": "10.1103/PhysRevLett.95.010503",
"journal_ref": "Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 010503 (2005)",
"title": "No Signalling and Quantum Key Distribution",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0405101"
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