dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaCognitive Sovereignty and the Neurosecurity Governance Gap: Evidence from Singapore
| Authors | Hailee Carter |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | 2601.06040vv1 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.06040 |
| License | http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ |
Abstract
As brain computer interfaces (BCIs) transition from experimental medical systems to consumer and military adjacent technologies, they introduce a novel security domain in which the human nervous system becomes a networked and contestable substrate. Existing frameworks for cybersecurity, biomedical safety, and data protection were not designed to address adversarial threats to neural signal integrity, creating a governance gap characterized by systemic misclassification. This paper argues that cognition is becoming strategic infrastructure and is situated between the market driven diffusion of neurotechnology in the United States and the state integrated fusion of AI and brain science in China. Using Singapore as a critical stress test and applying institutional classification analysis and regulatory mandate mapping, this paper identifies a structural paradox. A state with high regulatory capacity in both cyber and biomedical domains remains vulnerable at their intersection due to a failure to classify the human mind as infrastructure. This paper introduces the concept of cognitive sovereignty defined as the strategic capacity to protect neural processes from external modulation and proposes a cognitive operational technology framework to secure the human mind as a distinct layer of critical national infrastructure.
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"abstract": "As brain computer interfaces (BCIs) transition from experimental medical systems to consumer and military adjacent technologies, they introduce a novel security domain in which the human nervous system becomes a networked and contestable substrate. Existing frameworks for cybersecurity, biomedical safety, and data protection were not designed to address adversarial threats to neural signal integrity, creating a governance gap characterized by systemic misclassification. This paper argues that cognition is becoming strategic infrastructure and is situated between the market driven diffusion of neurotechnology in the United States and the state integrated fusion of AI and brain science in China. Using Singapore as a critical stress test and applying institutional classification analysis and regulatory mandate mapping, this paper identifies a structural paradox. A state with high regulatory capacity in both cyber and biomedical domains remains vulnerable at their intersection due to a failure to classify the human mind as infrastructure. This paper introduces the concept of cognitive sovereignty defined as the strategic capacity to protect neural processes from external modulation and proposes a cognitive operational technology framework to secure the human mind as a distinct layer of critical national infrastructure.",
"arxiv_id": "2601.06040",
"authors": [
"Hailee Carter"
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"license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
"title": "Cognitive Sovereignty and the Neurosecurity Governance Gap: Evidence from Singapore",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.06040",
"version": "v1"
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