{
  "annotation_id": "0c73835d-20bb-42f6-b131-3c9f95a18888",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:02:40.458000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:02:40.458000Z",
  "file_hash": "1a3b815938363ae098474e474103f9778a75c103c6815d5ff96c9b618545d825",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "This paper is a response to some recent discussions of many-minds\ninterpretations in the philosophical literature. After an introduction to the\nmany-minds idea, the complexity of quantum states for macroscopic objects is\nstressed. Then it is proposed that a characterization of the physical structure\nof observers is a proper goal for physical theory. It is argued that an\nobserver cannot be defined merely by the instantaneous structure of a brain,\nbut that the history of the brain\u0027s functioning must also be taken into\naccount. Next the nature of probability in many-minds interpretations is\ndiscussed and it is suggested that only discrete probability models are needed.\nThe paper concludes with brief comments on issues of actuality and identity\nover time.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/9703008",
    "authors": [
      "Matthew J. Donald"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "On Many-Minds Interpretations of Quantum Theory",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9703008"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "b84c6d66-7e48-4a21-b4ea-cd5d6479808e",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}