dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaImproved W\'{o}jcik's Eavesdropping Attack on Ping-Pong Protocol Without Eavesdropping-Induced Channel Loss
| Authors | Zhan-jun Zhang, Yong Li, Zhong-xiao Man |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0411030 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0411030 |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.05.023 |
Abstract
The eavesdropping scheme proposed by W\'{o}jcik [Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 90},157901(2003)] on the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 89}, 187902(2002)] is improved by constituting a new set of attack operations. The improved scheme has a zero eavesdropping-induced channel loss and produces perfect anticorrelation. Therefore, the eavesdropper Eve can safely attack all the transmitted bits and the eavesdropping information gain can always exceed the legitimate user's information gain in the whole domain of the quantum channel transmission efficiency $\eta$, i.e., [0,100%]. This means that the ping-pong protocol can be completely eavesdropped in its original version. But the improvement of the ping-pong protocol security produced by W\'{o}jcik is also suitable for our eavesdropping attack.
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"abstract": "The eavesdropping scheme proposed by W\\\u0027{o}jcik [Phys. Rev. Lett. {\\bf\n90},157901(2003)] on the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. {\\bf 89},\n187902(2002)] is improved by constituting a new set of attack operations. The\nimproved scheme has a zero eavesdropping-induced channel loss and produces\nperfect anticorrelation. Therefore, the eavesdropper Eve can safely attack all\nthe transmitted bits and the eavesdropping information gain can always exceed\nthe legitimate user\u0027s information gain in the whole domain of the quantum\nchannel transmission efficiency $\\eta$, i.e., [0,100%]. This means that the\nping-pong protocol can be completely eavesdropped in its original version. But\nthe improvement of the ping-pong protocol security produced by W\\\u0027{o}jcik is\nalso suitable for our eavesdropping attack.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0411030",
"authors": [
"Zhan-jun Zhang",
"Yong Li",
"Zhong-xiao Man"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph"
],
"doi": "10.1016/j.physleta.2005.05.023",
"title": "Improved W\\\u0027{o}jcik\u0027s Eavesdropping Attack on Ping-Pong Protocol Without Eavesdropping-Induced Channel Loss",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0411030"
},
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