dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaUsing quantum oblivious transfer to cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment
| Authors | Andreas Jakoby, Maciej Liskiewicz, Aleksander Madry |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | quant-ph/0605150 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0605150 |
Abstract
It is well known that unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible even in the quantum world. In this paper a weak variant of quantum bit commitment, introduced independently by Aharonov et al. [STOC, 2000] and Hardy and Kent [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 (2004)] is investigated. In this variant, the parties require some nonzero probability of detecting a cheating, i.e. if Bob, who commits a bit b to Alice, changes his mind during the revealing phase then Alice detects the cheating with a positive probability (we call this property binding); and if Alice gains information about the committed bit before the revealing phase then Bob discovers this with positive probability (sealing). In our paper we give quantum bit commitment scheme that is simultaneously binding and sealing and we show that if a cheating gives epsilon advantage to a malicious Alice then Bob can detect the cheating with a probability Omega(epsilon^2). If Bob cheats then Alice's probability of detecting the cheating is greater than some fixed constant lambda>0. This improves the probabilities of cheating detections shown by Hardy and Kent and the scheme by Aharonov et al. who presented a protocol that is either binding or sealing, but not simultaneously both. To construct a cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment scheme we use a protocol for a weak quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.
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"abstract": "It is well known that unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible\neven in the quantum world. In this paper a weak variant of quantum bit\ncommitment, introduced independently by Aharonov et al. [STOC, 2000] and Hardy\nand Kent [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 (2004)] is investigated. In this variant, the\nparties require some nonzero probability of detecting a cheating, i.e. if Bob,\nwho commits a bit b to Alice, changes his mind during the revealing phase then\nAlice detects the cheating with a positive probability (we call this property\nbinding); and if Alice gains information about the committed bit before the\nrevealing phase then Bob discovers this with positive probability (sealing). In\nour paper we give quantum bit commitment scheme that is simultaneously binding\nand sealing and we show that if a cheating gives epsilon advantage to a\nmalicious Alice then Bob can detect the cheating with a probability\nOmega(epsilon^2). If Bob cheats then Alice\u0027s probability of detecting the\ncheating is greater than some fixed constant lambda\u003e0. This improves the\nprobabilities of cheating detections shown by Hardy and Kent and the scheme by\nAharonov et al. who presented a protocol that is either binding or sealing, but\nnot simultaneously both. To construct a cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment\nscheme we use a protocol for a weak quantum one-out-of-two oblivious transfer.",
"arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0605150",
"authors": [
"Andreas Jakoby",
"Maciej Liskiewicz",
"Aleksander Madry"
],
"categories": [
"quant-ph",
"cs.CR"
],
"title": "Using quantum oblivious transfer to cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0605150"
},
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