{
  "annotation_id": "0537e290-1ca0-4f71-b7d6-516120a20703",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:46.024000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:46.024000Z",
  "file_hash": "3031d19fa2d5e13b65e499cbb1108dc49cbc9adff0df48dbe6aee5d214399e3c",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another\nso that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the\nfirst party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the\nevidence alone. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit\ncommitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is\ncodified in a general impossibility theorem. In this paper, the scope of this\ngeneral impossibility proof is analyzed, and gaps are found. Two variants of a\nbit commitment scheme utilizing anonymous quantum states and decoy states are\npresented. In the first variant, the exact verifying measurement is independent\nof the committed bit value, thus the second party can make it before the first\nparty opens, making possible an unconditional security proof based on\nno-cloning. In the second variant, the impossibility proof fails because\nquantum entanglement purification of a mixed state does not render the protocol\ndeterminate. Whether impossibility holds in this or similar protocols is an\nopen question, although preliminary results already show that the impossibility\nproof cannot work as it stands.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0109055",
    "authors": [
      "H. P. Yuen"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "How unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is possible",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0109055"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "370e653a-ced3-46b7-a47f-a44e1fb42329",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}