{
  "annotation_id": "03cc7630-6a83-4155-b795-8bac3a10b498",
  "date_created": "2026-03-02T18:01:45.515000Z",
  "date_modified": "2026-03-02T18:01:45.515000Z",
  "file_hash": "3c5c210e6d0efc094fd610cf63be0380aa2cc4d2701e4b62f010cd30ee28ed40",
  "private": false,
  "record": {
    "abstract": "An undetected eavesdropping attack must produce count rate statistics that\nare indistinguishable from those that would arise in the absence of such an\nattack. In principle this constraint should force a reduction in the amount of\ninformation available to the eavesdropper. In this paper we illustrate, by\nconsidering a particular class of eavesdropping attacks, how the general\nanalysis of this problem may proceed.",
    "arxiv_id": "quant-ph/0106034",
    "authors": [
      "G. Gilbert",
      "M. Hamrick"
    ],
    "categories": [
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    "title": "Constraints on Eavesdropping on the BB84 Protocol",
    "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0106034"
  },
  "schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
  "source": {
    "execution_id": "8c0704c6-b53e-404a-9690-0f8a9b07124f",
    "id": "arXiv Dataset IDs",
    "type": "Model",
    "variant": "snapshot-2026-03-01",
    "version": "0.1.0"
  },
  "user_id": 1000002
}