dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaEffects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on spatial Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma
| Authors | Margarita Ifti, Timothy Killingback, Michael Doebeli |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | q-bio/0405018 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0405018 |
| Journal | Journal of Theoretical Biology 231(1), 97 (2004) |
Abstract
The Prisoner's Dilemma, a 2-person game in which the players can either cooperate or defect, is a common paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation, when individuals exhibit variable degrees of cooperation. It is known that in the presence of spatial structure, when individuals ``play against'' their neighbours, and ``compare to'' them, cooperative investments can evolve to considerable levels. Here we examine the effect of increasing the neighbourhood size: we find that the mean-field limit of no cooperation is reached for a critical neighbourhood size of about five neighbours. We also find the related result that in a network of players, the critical average degree (number of neighbours) of nodes for which defection is the final state depends only on the network topology. This critical average degree is considerably higher for clustered networks, than for distributed random networks. This result strengthens the argument that clustering is the mechanism which makes the development and maintenance of the cooperation possible.
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"abstract": "The Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma, a 2-person game in which the players can either\ncooperate or defect, is a common paradigm for studying the evolution of\ncooperation, when individuals exhibit variable degrees of cooperation. It is\nknown that in the presence of spatial structure, when individuals ``play\nagainst\u0027\u0027 their neighbours, and ``compare to\u0027\u0027 them, cooperative investments\ncan evolve to considerable levels. Here we examine the effect of increasing the\nneighbourhood size: we find that the mean-field limit of no cooperation is\nreached for a critical neighbourhood size of about five neighbours. We also\nfind the related result that in a network of players, the critical average\ndegree (number of neighbours) of nodes for which defection is the final state\ndepends only on the network topology. This critical average degree is\nconsiderably higher for clustered networks, than for distributed random\nnetworks. This result strengthens the argument that clustering is the mechanism\nwhich makes the development and maintenance of the cooperation possible.",
"arxiv_id": "q-bio/0405018",
"authors": [
"Margarita Ifti",
"Timothy Killingback",
"Michael Doebeli"
],
"categories": [
"q-bio.PE"
],
"journal_ref": "Journal of Theoretical Biology 231(1), 97 (2004)",
"title": "Effects of neighbourhood size and connectivity on spatial Continuous Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0405018"
},
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